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Abstract. Local differential privacy (LDP) has received much interest
recently. In existing protocols with LDP guarantees, a user encodes and
perturbs his data locally before sharing it to the aggregator. In common
practice, however, users would prefer not to answer all the questions due
to different privacy-preserving preferences for different questions, which
leads to data missing or the loss of data quality. In this paper, we demon-
strate a new approach for addressing the challenges of data perturbation
with consideration of users’ privacy preferences. Specifically, we first pro-
pose BiSample: a bidirectional sampling technique value perturbation
in the framework of LDP. Then we combine the BiSample mechanism
with users’ privacy preferences for missing data perturbation. Theoreti-
cal analysis and experiments on a set of datasets confirm the effectiveness
of the proposed mechanisms.
Keywords: Local Differential Privacy ·Missing Data · Randomized Re-
sponse
1 Introduction
With the development of big data technologies, numerous data from users’ side
are routinely collected and analyzed. In online-investigation systems, statistical
information, especially the frequency and mean values can help investigators
know about the investigated population. However, users’ data are collected at
the risk of privacy leakage. Recently, local differential privacy (LDP) [5] has been
proposed as a solution to privacy-preserving data collection and analysis since
it provides provable privacy protection, regardless of adversaries’ background
knowledge. Usually, protocols with LDP guarantees can be broken down into
an Encode-Perturb-Aggregate paradigm. For single round of data sharing, each
user encodes his value (or tuple) into a specific data format, and then perturbs
the encoded value for privacy concerns. At last, all the perturbed data are ag-
gregated by an untrusted collector. Mechanisms with LDP guarantees have
been implemented in many real-world data collecting systems, such as Google’s
RAPPOR [8] and Microsoft’s telemetry data analyzing system [4].
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Although the LDP can balance the users’ privacy and data utilities, exist-
ing solutions assume that the investigated users follow the collecting process
truthfully. However, in an investigation system, even though the investigator
claims the collection process satisfies LDP, individuals may refuse to confide
some specific questions due to following considerations: 1) the provided privacy-
preserving level is not as expected, or 2) he just doesn’t want to tell anything
about the question. For example, if an investigator designed a ln 3-LDP mecha-
nism for personal-related data analyzing, those who think the privacy-preserving
is good enough would provide the real value for perturbation, while those who
extremely care about their healthy states might evade certain questions such
as “Do you have cancer?” because they think the in-built privacy-preserving
guarantee by LDP mechanism is not private enough. As existing perturbation
solutions demand an input, these individuals would randomly pick an answer
(or just answer “No”) and use it for perturbation (we call these fake answers).
In the perturbed space, the fake answers will lead to evasive bias.
Fig. 1. Missing Data Collecting and Analyzing Framework. For space consideration,
we use HC to represent the Hospitalization Cost and use Ans.Rate to represent the
rate of individuals who use real value for perturbation. The symbol ⊥ occurs when
users are not willing to provide real value, even in the LDP framework.
In this paper, we consider a “providing null-value” procedure to avoid the fake
answers when users perturb their data. Fig. 1 lists users’ privacy preferences and
original answers of each investigated question. Instead of sending a fake answer
when the provided privacy-preserving level is not as expected, the investigated
user sends a null-value to avoid a biased estimated result. The untrusted aggre-
gator wants to analyze basic statistical information, for each question, 1) how
many people provide the real value, 2) what is the frequency/mean of the whole
investigated population.
We for the first time consider the influence of users’ cooperation on the es-
timation accuracy. We first propose a bi-directional sampling mechanism called
BiSample and use it for numerical value perturbation. Then we extend the
BiSample to be capable of the null-value perturbation while still being locally
differentially private. In general, this paper presents following contributions:
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2. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
– For the first time, we consider that not all users will provide the true data for
perturbation in a collecting and analyzing framework. Our proposed miss-
ing data perturbation framework provides new insights into improving data
utilities by modeling users’ privacy-preserving preferences.
– We propose BiSample, a bi-directional sampling mechanism for data pertur-
bation. Literately, the BiSample mechanism can replace the Harmony [12]
solution for mean estimation. Furthermore, we extend the BiSample to be
capable of perturbing null-value data. Our mechanism allows to analyze the
rate of users who provided true answers and can be used for frequency/mean
estimation with LDP guarantees.
– As the proposed framework can be used to estimate the rate of users who
provide real value under privacy budget , the BiSample mechanism can be
used to study how to set privacy budget appropriately by the aggregator.
– Experimentally, the proposed mechanism achieves lower estimation error
than existing mechanisms.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide the necessary
background of LDP and define the problem of analyzing missing data in our
framework. Then we propose the BiSample mechanism in Section 3 and apply
BiSample for missing data in Section 4. The evaluations of the proposed mecha-
nism are shown in Section 5. At last, the whole paper is concluded in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Definition
2.1 Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy [2, 5, 6]). A randomized mecha-
nism M(·) achieves -local differential privacy if and only if for every two input
tuples t1, t2 in the domain of M, and for any output t∗ ∈ Range(M) that:
Pr[M(t1) = t∗] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(t2) = t∗] (1)
Unlike earlier attempts to preserve privacy, such as k-anonymity [15] and
l-diversity [11], the LDP retains “plausible deniability” of sensitive information.
The LDP has been used in a variety of application areas since proposed, such
as heavy hitters estimation [1, 2, 13], histogram estimation [3, 17], and marginal
release [3].
The canonical solution towards LDP is the randomized response (RR [7,
18]). Specifically, to collect sensitive information from users, e.g., whether the
patient is a HIV carrier, RR is used for perturbing the actual answers while
still guarantees that i) each user’s answer provides plausible deniability, ii) the
aggregator can get an unbiased estimation over the whole population. Many
start-of-the-art mechanisms use RR as a core part to provide privacy guarantees,
such as the LDPMiner [13], LoPub [14] and RAPPOR [8]. To handle categorical
data with arbitrary number of possible values, the k-RR [9] is proposed. In typical
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RR, each user shares his answer truthfully with probability p and provide the
opposite answer with 1− p. To achieve -LDP, the probability p is set by:
p =
exp()
exp() + 1
. (2)
Let fr denote the proportion of positive (resp. negative) answers received
by the aggregator, the frequency of positive (resp. negative) answers before per-
turbing can be estimated by:
f∗ =
p− 1 + fr
2p− 1 , (3)
then f∗ is an unbiased estimator of f .
Recently, the numerical value perturbation under LDP for mean estimation
has been addressed in the literature. We briefly introduce the Harmony [12] and
Piecewise mechanism [16].
Harmony. Nguyeˆn et al. [12] proposed Harmony for collecting and analyzing
data from smart device users. Shown as Alg. 1, Harmony contains three steps:
discretization, perturbation and adjusting. The discretization is used to generate
a discretized value in {-1, 1}, then Randomized Response is applied to achieve
-LDP. At last, to output an unbiased value, the perturbed value is adjusted.
Algorithm 1 Harmony [12] for Mean Estimation.
Require: value v ∈ [−1, 1] and privacy budget .
Ensure: discretized value x∗ ∈ {− e+1
e−1 ,
e+1
e−1}
1: Discretize value to v∗ ∈ {−1, 1} by:
v∗ = Dis(v) =
{
−1 with probability 1−v
2
1 with probability 1+v
2
2: Perturb v∗ by using randomized response:
v∗ =
{
v∗ with probability e

e+1
−v∗ with probability 1
e+1
3: Adjusted the perturbed by:
v∗ =
e + 1
e − 1 · v
∗
4: return v∗
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2. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Piecewise Mechanism. The Piecewise Mechanism (PM) [16] is another per-
turbation solution for mean estimation. Unlike the Harmony, the output domain
of PM is continuous from − exp(/2)+1exp(/2)−1 to exp(/2)+1exp(/2)−1 . The PM is used for collecting
a single numeric attribute under LDP. Based on PM, [16] also build a Hybrid
Mechanism (HM) for mean estimation. The PM and HM obtain higher result
accuracy compared to existing methods.
2.2 Problem Definition
This paper researches the problem of data collecting and analyzing while consid-
ering users’ privacy preferences in the context of LDP. For simplicity, we assume
that each user holds one single value vi.
Table 1. Notations.
Symbol Description
U = {u1, u2, ..., un} the set of users, where n = |U|
vi value of user ui, vi ∈ [−1, 1] ∪ {⊥}
iu privacy demand of ui
 privacy budget of perturbation mechanism
p p = e/(e + 1)
Modeling users’ privacy preferences. As detailed in the introduction
part, for one single investigating question, different users have different pri-
vacy preferences. Without loss of generality, we use iu to describe the privacy-
preserving preferences of ui and we assume that user ui only collaborates with
the data collector when the provided privacy-preserving level is higher than ex-
pected (which is  ≤ iu). When the provided privacy-preserving level is not as
expected ( > iu), the user ui provides a null-value (represented by vi = ⊥)
instead of the fake answer for perturbation.
After perturbation, data from users’ side are collected by an untrusted aggre-
gator, who wants to learn some statistical information from all users, especially
the rate of null-value and the mean value of all users.
Definition 2 (Mean of missing data). For a list of values v = {v1, v2, ..., vn}
where each value vi:i∈[n] from user ui is in domain [−1, 1] ∪ {⊥}, the missing
rate and the mean of v is defined as:
mr =
#{vi|vi = ⊥}
n
, m =
∑
vi 6=⊥ vi
#{vi|vi 6= ⊥} . (4)
Also, when ∀i : iu ≥ , the estimation of mean of missing data turns to be
the tradition mean estimation problems:
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Algorithm 2 BiSample(v, ): Bidirectional Sampling Mechanism
Require: a value v ∈ [−1, 1], privacy budget .
1: sample a uniformly variable s ∈ {0, 1} representing the sampling direction.
2: if s = 0 then
3: use Negative Sampling: generate a Bernoulli variable b with:
Pr[b = 1] =
1− exp()
1 + exp()
· v
2
+
1
2
.
4: else
5: use Positive Sampling: generate a Bernoulli variable b with:
Pr[b = 1] =
exp()− 1
exp() + 1
· v
2
+
1
2
.
6: end if
7: return s, b.
Definition 3 (Mean of values). For a list of values v = {v1, v2, ..., vn} where
each value vi∈[n] is in domain [−1, 1]. The mean of v is defined as:
m =
∑
i∈[n] vi
n
. (5)
3 BiSample: Bidirectional Sampling Technique
Before presenting solution for missing data perturbation, we first propose a
bidirectional sampling technique, referred to as the BiSample Mechanism. The
BiSample mechanism takes a value v ∈ [−1, 1] as input and outputs a per-
turbed tuple 〈s, b〉 where s represents the sampling direction and b represents
the sampling result of v. Specifically, the BiSample mechanism contains two basic
sampling directions, which is defined as:
– Negative Sampling with LDP. The negative sampling is used to estimate
the frequency of -1 after discretization. The perturbing procedure of negative
sampling is:
Pr[b = 1] = (2p− 1) · Pr[Dis(v) = −1] + (1− p). (6)
– Positive Sampling with LDP. Like negative sampling, the positive sam-
pling is used to estimate the frequency of 1 after discretization. Notably, the
typical RR is positive sampling.
Pr[b = 1] = (2p− 1) · Pr[Dis(v) = 1] + (1− p). (7)
Assuming the input domain is [−1, 1], Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of
BiSample. Without loss of generality, when the input domain is [L,U ], the user
(i) computes v′ = 2U−L ·v+ L+UL−U , (ii) perturbs v′ using the BiSample mechanism,
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3. BISAMPLE: BIDIRECTIONAL SAMPLING TECHNIQUE
and (iii) shares 〈s, (U−L2 ) · b + U+L2 〉 with the aggregator, where s denotes the
sampling method and b is the sampling result of v′. In Algorithm 2, Lines 2-3
show the negative sampling process and Lines 5-6 denote the positive sampling.
We prove that the combination of positive and negative sampling satisfies -LDP.
Theorem 1. The BiSample mechanism M = BiSample(·) guarantees -LDP.
Proof. For any t1, t2 ∈ [−1, 1] and output o ∈ Range(M), we have:
ln max
t1,t2∈[−1,1],o∈Range(M)
Pr[M(t1) = o]
Pr[M(t2) = o]
= ln max
t1,t2∈[−1,1],b∈{0,1}
Pr[M(t1) = 〈0, b〉]
Pr[M(t2) = 〈0, b〉]
= ln
maxt1∈[−1,1] Pr[M(t1) = 〈0, 0〉]
mint2∈[−1,1] Pr[M(t2) = 〈0, 0〉]
= ln
(
exp()
2(exp() + 1)
/
1
2(exp() + 1)
)
= . (8)
According to the definition of LDP, the BiSample achieves -LDP.
With the BiSample perturbation, a value vi in the input domain is perturbed
into a two-bit tupleMBiSample(vi) = 〈si, bi〉. The result is two-fold. First, the si
indicates whether the sampling mechanism is positive sampling or not. Second,
the bi represents the sampling value with correspond sampling mechanism. For
the aggregator, let R = {〈s1, b1〉, 〈s2, b2〉, ...〈sn, bn〉} be the perturbed data re-
ceived from all the users and fPOS (resp. fNEG) be the aggregated frequency of
positive sampling (resp. negative sampling), which is given by:
fPOS =
#{〈si, bi〉|〈si, bi〉 = 〈1, 1〉, 〈si, bi〉 ∈ R}
#{〈si, bi〉|si = 1, 〈si, bi〉 ∈ R} , (9)
fNEG =
#{〈si, bi〉|〈si, bi〉 = 〈0, 1〉, 〈si, bi〉 ∈ R}
#{〈si, bi〉|si = 0, 〈si, bi〉 ∈ R} . (10)
Theorem 2. m∗ is an unbiased estimator of m = 1n
∑
i:i∈[n] vi, where m
∗ is
given by:
m∗ =
1
2p− 1 (fPOS − fNEG) . (11)
Proof. Firstly, the m∗ can be represented by:
E[m∗] = E
[
1
2p− 1 (fPOS − fNEG)
]
= E
[
1
2p− 1 ((fPOS + p− 1)− (fNEG + p− 1))
]
=
(
E
[
fPOS + p− 1
2p− 1
]
− E
[
fNEG + p− 1
2p− 1
])
. (12)
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Then, according to Eq. (3), the fPOS+p−12p−1 (resp.
fNEG+p−1
2p−1 ) represents the
estimated frequency of number 1 (resp. −1) before perturbation. According to the
bidirectional sampling process, we then have:
E[m∗] =
1
n
· E [#{i|Dis(vi) = 1}]− 1
n
· E [#{i|Dis(vi) = −1}]
=
1
n
·
∑
i∈[n]
vi = m. (13)
We then conclude that m∗ is unbiased. Also, the variance of BiSample is
given by:
Var[m∗] = E[(m∗)2]− (E[m∗])2
=
(
exp() + 1
exp()− 1
)2
−m2. (14)
Therefore, the worst-case variance of the BiSample mechanism equals
(
e+1
e−1
)2
,
which is the same as the Harmony solution. Normally, when using perturbation
in d-dimensional data with -LDP guarantee, the maximum difference between
the true mean and the estimated mean is bounded with high probability. Shown
as Theorem 3, the proof is similar to the one in [12].
Theorem 3. For j ∈ [d], let m∗j denote the estimator of mj = 1n
∑
i∈[n] vi,j by
the BiSample mechanism. With at least probability 1− β, we have:
∣∣m∗j −mj∣∣ = O
(√
d · log(d/β)√
n · 
)
. (15)
4 Using BiSample for Missing Data Perturbation
Fig. 2. The BiSample-MD Framework.
The proposed BiSample mechanism uses a bi-directional sampling technique
for numerical value perturbation. However, it cannot handle the fake answer
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4. USING BISAMPLE FOR MISSING DATA PERTURBATION
situation. In this section, we consider a providing null-value procedure and pro-
pose the BiSample-MD framework that extends the BiSample for missing data.
Fig. 2 illustrates the BiSample-MD model. We use iu to represent the privacy
preference of ui and use  to represent the privacy budget of the perturbation
mechanism provided by the aggregator. Before perturbing value locally, each
user uses the PV (v, u, ) (shown as Algorithm 3) to decide whether using the
real value or not. When the privacy-preserving level of perturbation mechanism
is higher than user’s expectation, the PV (vi, 
i
u, ) returns the real value v
′ = v.
Otherwise, the PV (·) returns a null-value v′ = ⊥.
Algorithm 3 PV (v, u, ): Prepare Value.
Require: user’s value v ∈ [−1, 1] and user’s expected privacy budget u, system pri-
vacy budget .
1: if  ≤ u then
2: return v.
3: else
4: return ⊥.
5: end if
Then v′ is used for perturbing instead of v, the domain of v′ is [−1, 1]∪{⊥}.
We then design the BiSample-MD algorithm for perturbing v′. Even though
the input domain is different from that of BiSample, we still design the output
domain to be s ∈ {0, 1}, b ∈ {0, 1}. The BiSample-MD perturbation process is
detailed in Algorithm 4. Like BiSample, the BiSample-MD also contains positive
sampling and negative sampling. When v′ = ⊥, both the positive and negative
sampling all sample b = 1 with probability 1/(exp()+1). The following theorem
shows that the BiSample-MD algorithm satisfies -LDP.
Theorem 4. Alg. 4 achieves -LDP.
Proof. Shown in Theorem 1, it is proven that when iu > , the BiSample-MD
mechanism is -LDP. In this way, we only need to consider the situation when
the null-value occurs. Without loss of generality, we assume t1 = ⊥. we have:
max
t2∈[−1,1],s∈{0,1},b∈{0,1}
{
Pr [M(⊥) = 〈s, b〉]
Pr [M(t2) = 〈s, b〉] ,
Pr [M(t2) = 〈s, b〉]
Pr [M(⊥) = 〈s, b〉]
}
= max
t2∈[−1,1],b∈{0,1}
Pr [M(⊥) = 〈0, b〉]
Pr [M(t2) = 〈0, b〉] =
Pr[M(⊥) = 〈0, 0〉]
mint2∈[−1,1] Pr[M(t2) = 〈0, 0〉]
.
According the perturbation mechanism, the numerator is given by:
Pr [M(⊥) = 〈0, 0〉] = Pr[s = 0] · Pr[b = 0] = 1
2
· exp()
1 + exp()
, (16)
while the denominator can be calculated by:
min
t2∈[−1,1]
Pr[M(t2) = 〈0, 0〉] = Pr[M(−1) = 〈0, 0〉] = 1
2
· 1
exp() + 1
. (17)
9
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Algorithm 4 BiSample-MD(v, u, ): BiSample for Missing Data.
Require: user’s value v ∈ [−1, 1] and user’s expected privacy budget u, system pri-
vacy budget .
1: v′ = PV (v, u, )
2: sample a uniformly variable s ∈ {0, 1} representing the sampling direction.
3: if s = 0 then
4: Generate a Bernoulli variable b with:
Pr[b = 1] =
{
1−exp()
1+exp()
· v′
2
+ 1
2
if v′ ∈ [−1, 1];
1
exp()+1
if v′ = ⊥.
5: end if
6: if s = 1 then
7: Generate a Bernoulli variable b with:
Pr[b = 1] =
{
exp()−1
exp()+1
· v′
2
+ 1
2
if v′ ∈ [−1, 1];
1
exp()+1
if v′ = ⊥.
8: end if
9: return s, b
According to Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), the privacy budget is bounded by  when
the value is a null-value. To sum up, the BiSample-MD algorithm is -LDP.
The perturbed data are then collected by the aggregator. Let s be the sum
of values provided truthfully, which is given by s =
∑
i:iu<
vi and f⊥ be the
fraction of users who provide a null-value for perturbation, which is given by
f⊥ = #{i : iu < }/n. Then we can estimate s and f⊥ by:
s∗ =
n
2p− 1 · (fPOS − fNEG), f
∗
⊥ =
1− fPOS − fNEG
2p− 1 , (18)
where the fPOS and fNEG are defined in Equations 9 and 10. The correctness of
the estimation is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. s∗ and f∗⊥ are unbiased estimators of s and f⊥.
Proof. The main intuition behind this theorem is that in the positive sampling
process, the perturbed result only contains whether the value is 1 or not. Under
such principle, there is no difference between v = −1 of v = ⊥ when using
positive sampling. Thus, following the proof of Theorem. 2, it is easy to prove
that s∗ is unbiased. For f⊥ we have:
E[f∗⊥] = E[
1− fPOS − fNEG
2p− 1 ]
= 1− E[fPOS + p− 1
2p− 1 ]− E[
fNEG + p− 1
2p− 1 ]
= f⊥. (19)
Thus, both s∗ and f∗⊥ are unbiased.
10
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5. EXPERIMENTS
With the unbiased estimator of the sum of values
∑
vi 6=⊥ vi and the unbiased
estimator of the missing rate, we can then estimate the mean by:
m∗ =
s∗
n · (1− f∗⊥)
=
fPOS − fNEG
fPOS + fNEG + 2p− 2 . (20)
5 Experiments
In the experimental part, we empirically evaluate the proposed mechanisms.
5.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets. To evaluate the proposed mechanisms, we first generated three syn-
thetic datasets: the GAUSS follows Gaussian distribution with location µ = 0.5
and scale σ = 0.1, the EXP dataset follows Exponential distribution with scale
0.1 and the UNIFORM dataset follows uniform distribution. Each dataset con-
tains 105 users. We also use the ADULT dataset [10] for evaluation. We extract
the Age attribution and regularize each value to [−1, 1] for mean estimation.
Table 2. Dataset Description.
Dataset Distribution # Instances Mean Value
EXP exponential 105 -0.831
GAUSS Gaussian 105 0.499
UNIFORM uniform 105 -0.001
ADULT - 32561 -0.409
Methodology for null-value perturbation. In terms of mean estimation,
we compare BiSample with the Harmony [12] and the Piecewise mechanism
(PM [16]). For missing data perturbation, we encode the original data to a key-
value format. The real value v is represented by 〈1, v〉 and the null-value v = ⊥ is
represented by 〈0,−〉. We then use PrivKVM [19] for the missing rate estimation
and mean estimation. The missing rate is given by f⊥ = 1− fk, where fk is the
frequency of key given by PrivKVM. We use one real iteration and five virtual
iterations.
Utility metric. All experiments are performed 100 times repeatedly. We eval-
uate the performance of missing rate (mr) estimation and mean estimation (m)
by the average absolute error and variance, which are defined by (T = 100):{
AE(mr) = 1T
∑ |f⊥ − f∗⊥|, AE(m) = 1T ∑ |m−m∗|;
Var(mr) = 1T
∑
(f⊥ − f∗⊥)2, Var(m) = 1T
∑
(m−m∗)2. (21)
where f⊥ and m (resp. f∗⊥ and m
∗) are the true (resp. estimated) missing rate
and the mean value.
11
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(a) Users’ Privacy Preferences Distribution. (b) Rate of True Answers varying .
Fig. 3. The Impact of Users’ Privacy Preferences to Rate of True Answers.
5.2 Varying User Behavior
In this part of experiments, we consider the task of collecting an 1-dimensional
value from each user while considering users’ privacy preferences. Since no ex-
isting solution researched the distribution of users’ privacy preferences, shown
as Fig. 3(a), we generated Gaussian data with µ = 5 and σ = 1.5 as the users’
preferences distribution. Fig. 3(b) plots the rate of users who would truthfully
provide the real value for perturbation according to . Basically, when the pri-
vacy budget  is small, the privacy-preserving level provided by the perturbation
mechanism is high, so most people would like to share their real value. In con-
trast, with a high , few people want to use real value for perturbation as the
perturbing process is not privacy-preserving enough. As existing solutions forces
an input, we consider two kinds of user behaviors when the privacy-preserving
level of LDP is lower than users’ expectation: the TOP mode and the RND
mode. In the TOP mode, users always use the value 1 instead of the real value
for perturbation. In the RND mode, each user randomly generates a value, uses
it for perturbation and shares the perturbed result.
Using the absolute error as utility measurement, Fig. 4 shows the average ab-
solute error over both synthetic datasets and real-world dataset with the change
of , where the TOP and RND represent user behaviors when u < . For the
presentation purpose, methods with similar performance are grouped together
in Fig. 4. We first observe that for the PM and Harmony mechanisms, the per-
formance is close to each other. For these two mechanisms, the influence of user
behaviors (TOP or RND) is great. In Fig. 4(c), it is a coincidence that the per-
formance of RND-based mechanisms are as good as the BiSample mechanism
because for uniformly distributed data. This is explainable as randomly generate
a fake answer would not affect the mean value statistically.
Usually, in conventional settings without consideration of users’ privacy pref-
erences, the error of mean estimation becomes smaller with a larger , as the
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5. EXPERIMENTS
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Fig. 4. Mean Estimation on Different Datasets.
privacy-preserving level decreases. However, our simulation shows a different
opinion. With the increase of privacy budget, the estimation performance would
also become poor. As for users, when the privacy budget is too large, they refuse
to provide the real value for perturbation because they think their privacy is not
well-guaranteed. Also, in this setting, only the PrivKVM and BiSample mecha-
nisms can estimate the missing rate.
5.3 Varying Missing Rate
The prior experiments are based on the assumption that users’ privacy prefer-
ences follow a Gaussian distribution. The main reason why users’ privacy pref-
erences greatly impact the estimation error is that the rate of users who provide
the real value for perturbation changes. Thus in this part of experiment, we di-
rectly explore the influence of the missing rate. We fix  ∈ {0.1, 1} and vary the
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Fig. 5. Variance Missing Rate.
missing rate to evaluate the estimation error. We only compare the BiSample
with PrivKVM as they both can be used for missing rate estimation.
The results are shown in Fig. 5. As expected, for all of the approaches,
the utility measurements decrease when the privacy budget increases. When
the missing rate is too high, the mean estimation becomes meaningless, as few
data can be used. We also observe that for both missing rate estimation (the
curve with “-mr”) and mean estimation (the curve with “-m”), the proposed
BiSample is superior to PrivKVM. We think the reason is that compared with
PrivKVM, we only use value for sampling, thus the introduced noise is lower to
that of PrivKVM. Another observation is that in each experiment, the missing
rate estimation is more accurate than the mean estimation. The reason is that
the missing rate estimation only uses typical randomized response, while the
perturbation process involves both discretization and perturbation.
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6. CONCLUSION
 BiSample
 BiSample
(a) Mean Estimation. ( = 0.1) (b) Missing Rate Estimation. ( = 0.1)
Fig. 6. Estimation Performance varying Data Size.
5.4 Varying Size of Data
We also consider the influence of the size of data on mean estimation and missing
rate estimation. We use the absolute error for evaluation. In the mean estimation
of Fig. 6(a), we first observe that for PrivKVM and BiSample, the estimation
error decreases with a larger size of data. The error of both Harmony and PM
is very high because the main inaccuracy is that these two mechanism can not
handle the missing data. We observe from Fig. 6(b) that the difference between
PrivKVM and BiSample is not obvious in terms of missing rate estimation.
Overall, the BiSample outperforms PrivKVM in terms of mean estimation.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we research the influence of users’ privacy-preserving preferences
on mean estimation in the framework of LDP. We first propose BiSample, a bidi-
rectional sampling technique for value perturbation. Then users’ privacy pref-
erences are considered to avoid fake answers from the user side. Experimental
results show that the proposed mechanism can be used for both conventional
mean estimation and null-value perturbation with LDP guarantees.
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